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The Use of the Trials against the Members of the Gestapo in 
Belgium as a Source for Historical Research
Abstract
Academic historians have an ambiguous relationship with the use of documents produced 
in the context of criminal investigations. On the one hand, these documents provide an ava-
lanche of information, often giving a voice to historical actors that would otherwise stay hid-
den in classical top-down history. On the other hand, academics denounce such documents 
as inherently biased and thus unfit for use in an “objective” reconstruction of the past. This 
problem’s urgency increases in the context of a politically tense period such as the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War. In post-war Belgium, military courts were responsible 
for bringing to justice both German officials and Belgian collaborators. This paper identifies 
the methodological possibilities and problems associated with the use of the documents 
these courts amassed to this end with regard to research on the Holocaust and the German 
occupation of Belgium and to history-writing in general. Among others, elements such as 
the influence of the internal workings of the military court and the legal framework in which 
it had to operate, the similarities and differences in how historians and prosecutors go about 
their research, and how defence strategies employed by suspects/perpetrators as well as wit-
nesses/victims twisted their hearings and testimonies, are addressed. The paper concludes 
that although judicial sources come with inherent limitations, they can be employed in aca-
demic history as long as attention is paid to the specific context in which they were produced 
and they are subjected to proper critical reading.
Historical research and criminal investigations have often benefited from each 
other. From Montaillou, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s famous reconstruction of every-
day life in a French medieval village, to Ordinary Men, Christopher Browning’s 
 assessment of the motivation of a grassroots German execution squad during the 
Holocaust, historians have used the documents produced during criminal investiga-
tions to study the past in the context of a range of time periods and methodologies.1 
Reversely, historians have often been asked to serve as experts in legal proceedings, for 
example in the trial between David Irving and Deborah Lipstadt. Irving’s claim for 
libel against Lipstadt for calling him a Holocaust denier was refuted using testimonies 
by a wide range of academic specialists of the field, an effort that was coordinated by 
Cambridge historian Richard J. Evans.2 More rarely, there are prosecutors who have 
the intention to shape historical narrative. This was the case, for example, at the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The proceedings there not only produced a 
substantial amount of documentation on the internal workings of the Third Reich but 
also influenced historiography for several decades with its interpretation of Nazi 
 Germany as a plutocratic, organised chaos. The prosecution, especially Telford Taylor, 
wanted to openly confront the German public and force them to accept the necessary 
1 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Montaillou. The World-Famous Portrait of Life in a Medieval Village, Middlesex 
1980; Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, 
London 2001.
2 David Irving v. Penguin Books and Lipstat (High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division 2000).
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historical and moral lessons.3 In this paper, I will look at the methodological pitfalls 
when using documents formed in criminal investigations and court proceedings for 
carrying out historical research. I will use as an example my own research into the 
activities of the Gestapo in Belgium during the Second World War.4 This research is 
mostly based on the post-war trials that were brought against Belgian collaborators 
and German war criminals between 1944 and 1949. The problems I address stem 
from four elements: the similarities and dissimilarities between historians and judi-
cial magistrates, the influence of the workings of the post-war military court system 
on the interpretation of the documents, the influence of the legal logic of the court, 
and finally the inherent value of the amassed documentation. 
Criminal law and history
Several historians have already discussed the intricate interplay between criminal 
law investigations and academic history, and the methodological repercussions of 
the use of the documents produced by the former for scientific research.5 These au-
thors all agree to a large extent that the work of a historian and that of a prosecutor 
are similar. Both start from a hypothesis about a past event. Both set out to find evi-
dence and arguments to prove or disprove this theory. In both cases some sort of 
judgement concludes the research: a verdict in the case of court proceedings, an 
 answer to the hypothesis in the case of historical research. This abstract level is where 
similarities end. In practice a historian has more liberty to define the boundaries of 
these three elements. A prosecutor is restricted by the limits posed by the law: he can 
only investigate whether an action in the past is punishable under the criminal law 
effective at the time (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege), in his research he is limit-
ed by the restrictions posed by criminal procedure, and the judgement is restricted 
to formulating an answer to the question of guilt.6 These two elements, the legal 
 restrictions and the necessity of formulating a verdict of guilt, predetermine the re-
search and its outcome from an early stage of the investigation. A historian can work 
more freely in all three elements. With an event or person situated in the past, the 
subject matter remains the same. In posing questions to the subject, finding infor-
mation, and formulating conclusions, a historian is only limited by his or her own 
3 Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial. War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memo-
ry, Oxford 2001, 222.
4 For preliminary findings dealing with the Gestapo in Antwerp, see: Robby Van Eetvelde, De Sicherheit-
spolizei und Sicherheitsdienst (Sipo-SD) Aussendienststelle Antwerpen. Het politionele repertoire van een 
lokale Duitse politiedienst in bezet België, in: Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis 15 (2008) 19, 135-179; 
Robby Van Eetvelde, De weg van Vlaamse ‘daders’ naar de Gestapo: de tolken van de Antwerpse Sipo-SD, in: 
Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 124 (2009) 3, 349-367; Robby Van 
Eetvelde, La police allemande dans la ville de l’Escaut. L’activité de la Gestapo à Anvers, in: Daniel Weyssow 
(ed.), Les caves de la Gestapo. Reconnaissance et conservation, trans. Marie Mariani, Entre histoire et mé-
moire 6, Paris: Kimé/Fondation Auschwitz, 2013, 36-53.
5 Michael Wildt, Differierende Wahrheiten. Historiker und Staatsanwälte als Ermittler von NS-Verbrechen, in: 
Norbert Frei/Dirk Van Laak/Michael Stolleis, Geschichte vor Gericht. Historiker, Richter und die Suche nach 
Gerechtigkeit, München 2000, 46-59; Michael Stolleis, Der Historiker als Richter – der Richter als Historiker, 
in: Wolfgang Benz/Bernhard Diestelkamp/Michael Stolleis (Hg.), Justizalltag im Dritten Reich, Frankfurt a. 
M. 1988, 173-182; Henry Rousso, Justiz, Geschichte und Erinnerung in Frankreich. Überlegungen zum Pa-
pon-Prozeß, in: Norbert Frei/Dirk Van Laak/Michael Stolleis (Hg.), Geschichte vor Gericht: Historiker, Rich-
ter und die Suche nach Gerichtigkeit, München 2000, 141-163; Johannes C. Blom, Historische en strafrechteli-
jke ‘ordening van de chaos’, in: Mark Spiering et al. (ed.), De weerspannigheid van de feiten. Opstellen over 
geschiedenis, politiek, recht en literatuur. Aangeboden aan W.H. Roobol, Hilversum 2000, 23-32.
6 The use of male pronouns and possessive forms to denote individuals in their function was chosen to improve 
the readability of the text, they do not constitute a value judgement and are used in a gender-neutral manner.
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imagination, by whatever taboo society imposes on research topics, and by the limi-
tations posed by the requirements of the academic historical profession. The latter 
includes a proper critical treatment of the source material and the possibility of veri-
fication by peers, for example by using footnotes. 
As a general rule, historians prefer to work with documentation formed as close as 
possible to the historical event they are investigating. These documents are given the 
merit of more credibility and objectivity, since they are not yet distorted by the bias of 
fading memory, by Hineininterpretierung, or by defence strategies. But what should a 
historian do if such sources are not, or not widely enough, available? This is the case for 
my own research, dealing with the activity of the infamous German secret police, the 
Gestapo, in Belgium during the Second World War. The German occupiers could an-
ticipate the advance of the allied armies. The SS police destroyed most of its institu-
tional documentation in the bonfires accompanying the German retreat.7 As a result, 
historians looking at the activity of the German police need to find alternative sources.
Post-war Belgian “repression”
This alternative can be found in the post-war trials, which were brought against 
collaborators and German war criminals. The Belgian government in exile prepared 
its comeback in a timely fashion. A swift punishment of collaborators was part of a 
deliberate policy of quickly re-establishing state authority. The government in Lon-
don had initially intended this process to be largely symbolic, focusing on the most 
prominent collaborators. The mounting German repression at the end of the occu-
pation and the subsequent resentment and popular fury among the population 
made this option an impossibility. The purpose of this operation went further than 
the desire to avoid the mob’s revenge against collaborators and to keep the monopo-
ly on violence in the hands of the legitimate government. The resistance’s claim to 
power and the pre-war challenges brought against the political state of affairs by the 
collaborating parties VNV and Rex also had to be eliminated.8 As such, as Martin 
Conway has argued, the post-war repression became more a tool of political and eco-
nomical reconstruction than a means of challenging the status-quo.9
The uncertainty of how easily the Belgian territory would be liberated inspired the 
decision to give responsibility for the post-war “repression” not to civilian criminal 
courts, but to military courts. These would be able to operate in wartime conditions, 
their civilian counterparts would not. This decision had an important procedural 
consequence. In a civil court, a researching magistrate, a juge d’instruction, would 
carry out an investigation à charge and à décharge, meaning finding all elements 
which incriminate and exonerate a suspect, before passing on the collected material to 
the prosecution and defence. Obviously, such a researching magistrate should be 
completely objective and impartial. In a military court, a military magistrate com-
bined the function of researching magistrate and prosecutor. This carried the risk of 
affecting impartiality. Would the military magistrate already think as a prosecutor 
7 PV relatant à l’action 118, April 11, 1947, Gestapo Liège, Documentation Générale 4, 192, 4, Archives Military 
Court (AMC).
8 Kris Hoflack/Luc Huyse, De afrekening met de vrienden van de vijand, in: Luc Huyse and Kris Hoflack (ed.), 
De democratie heruitgevonden. Oud en nieuw in politiek België, 1944–1950, Leuven 1995, 27-30.
9 Martin Conway, Justice in Post-War Belgium. Popular Passions and Political Realities, in: Bijdragen tot de 
Eigentijdse Geschiedenis 4 (1997) 2, 24.
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during his supposed impartial research, steering it in a certain direction?10 Combined 
with the suggestion that the military court recruited young, inexperienced, and po-
litically motivated men as magistrates, this led to the conviction among certain circles 
that the post-war “repression” had a political aim, namely to once and for all silence 
political Flemish nationalism. This was consequently debunked by historical re-
search.11 Under the authority of Auditeur Général Walter Ganshof van der Meersch, 
405,067 files were built against suspected collaborators between 1944 and 1949. In 
57,000 cases this led to court proceedings. 53,000 individuals were actually convict-
ed.12 In other words, the potential material for historians to work with is enormous.
For a long time the policy of access to the case files for researchers was quite liberal. 
This changed in the late 1980’s: from then on, only the files of actually convicted col-
laborators could be looked into. This meant that investigations which did not produce 
enough material to warrant court proceedings, so-called non-lieux, as well as the files 
against individuals who at a later stage had been pardoned for their offences, could no 
longer be investigated. The Belgian archival law was not of much help, since this re-
stricted access to files from less than one hundred years ago.13 The logic of the legal 
system limited academic research. Legally, guilt is not or no longer an uncontested, 
objective fact in the aforementioned restricted cases. This, however, does not mean 
that the documentation these files contain no longer has any relevance from an aca-
demic point of view. In some instances the logic of the law lead to absurd restrictions. 
For example, information on the activity of the German leaders of the anti-Jewish sec-
tions of the Gestapo offices is in my opinion rather indispensable when researching 
the persecution of the local Jewish population. Yet, the German Judenberater were not 
brought to trial either in Antwerp or in Liège, the two instances of my own research. 
They had either escaped arrest or were assumed to be deceased. In both cases, the ju-
dicial research ended and was classified as a non-lieux. This classification barred the 
files from further research, even though the men would almost certainly have been 
convicted if only they had been arrested, especially given their perpetrated crimes.
The fact that the local Judenberater was not brought to trial is especially striking in 
the case of Antwerp, which housed forty-five percent of Belgium’s Jewish population 
and is the only case where the city police provided extensive assistance in round-ups. 
Erich Holm, head of the anti-Jewish section in Antwerp during the entire course of 
the occupation, managed to escape arrest. He was first taken prisoner by the Cana-
dian army in 1945, but managed to escape to South-Africa, where he was not further 
disturbed.14 The case file against his counterpart in Liège, Wilhelm Stade, known for 
his brutality and corruption, was wafer-thin.15 After the retreat from Belgian soil he 
was supposedly transferred for military duty to the Eastern front as a disciplinary 
10 Stanislas Horvat, Het verloop van de incivismeprocessen voor de militaire rechtbanken in 1944–1949, Dirk 
Luyten/ Chantal Kesteloot (ed.), Repressie en gerechtelijke archieven: problemen en perspectieven. Dossier bij 
het SOMA Berichtenblad no. 38 (2003), 3-23.
11 Dirk Luyten and Michel Magits, Aspecten van de werking van de krijgsauditoraten en de rekrutering van 
militaire parketmagistraten na de Tweede Wereldoorlog, in: Belgische Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschieden-
is 28 (1998) 1-2, 203-226;  Koen Aerts, De bestraffing van de collaboratie in België na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. 
Beeldvorming en onderzoek, in: Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis 16 (2009) 21, 55-92.
12 Hoflack and Huyse, De afrekening met de vrienden van de vijand, 30.
13 Bruno De Wever, Laat nu ook de geschiedenis oordelen, Dirk Luyten/Chantal Kesteloot (ed.), Repressie en 
gerechtelijke archieven: problemen en perspectieven, in: Dossier bij het SOMA Berichtenblad no. 38 (2003), 
28-33.
14 Nico Wouters, De Jodenvervolging voor de Belgische rechters, 1944–1951, in Rudi Van Doorslaer (ed.), Gewil-
lig België. Overheid en Jodenvervolging tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Antwerpen/Amsterdam/Brussel: 
Meulenhoff/Manteau, 2007, 932-933.
15 Ibid., 931.
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measure, where he was rumoured to have fallen in battle.16 As a result, the military 
court considered it futile to build a case file against them. Both in Antwerp and 
Liège, the local implementation of the Final Solution was reconstructed in the case 
files against the collaborators with the anti-Jewish section of the German police. In 
contrast to their immediate superiors, they did stand trial for their wartime actions. 
Bringing the immediate collaborators to justice instead of their German superiors 
bore an additional advantage. During the interwar period the Belgian legislator had 
neglected to modernise its penal code to include war crimes. And although accord-
ing to article 46 of the Hague Convention religious persecution was forbidden, it was 
much easier to use the traditional criminal laws which punished collaboration with 
the enemy (articles 115, 118bis, and 121bis) to bring suspects to trial.17 These laws 
could not be used for the persecution of German perpetrators of the Holocaust in 
Belgium. The German perpetrators were difficult to identify, locate, and extradite. A 
law that allowed Belgian courts to bring war crimes committed by non-nationals to 
trial was only passed in June 1947.18 By then, the nascent Cold War climate, in which 
rapprochement with West-Germany had a foremost role, further complicated mat-
ters. In March 1948, the US and UK decided to no longer extradite German suspects. 
Within three years, the window of opportunity to bring suspected German war 
criminals into Belgian jails had shut.19 
At the beginning of the new millennium, restrictions for accessing the files for 
academic research were lifted to a large extent. The logic of the legal system was ex-
changed for one which took into consideration the logic of historical research and 
the expectations of the public at large. Almost seventy years after the fact, this public 
is still exceedingly concerned with the history of National Socialism and the legacy 
of the Second World War, no doubt largely due to the influence this legacy had on 
political divisions in present-day Belgium.20 However, in the current age of austerity 
the previous legal restrictions were traded for practical ones. In June 2013, four Bel-
gian scholars criticises the long waiting periods for gaining access to files, which 
made it difficult for history students and academic historians alike to carry out re-
search in a realistic amount of time.21
The search for an ideal and unbiased source
In Antwerp, the suspects brought to trial for their contribution to the Holocaust 
were Felix Lauterboren and his gang of so-called Jew-hunters, infamous for hunting 
down Jews who had gone into hiding after the summer of 1942.22 In Liège, judgment 
was passed against Auguste Voss, Oscar Evrard, and Pierre Telgmann, who had not 
only assisted Stade in implementing the Final Solution in Liège, but also in the sur-
veillance of other religions, among others the Catholic Church. Evrard had been 
16 Extrait du PV 835, November 8, 1945, Gestapo Liège, Documentation Générale 4, AMC; PV 5487, July 28, 
1945, Nossent-Gruslin (NG), I, IV, 5, AMC.
17 Wouters, De Jodenvervolging, 822-823.
18 Lieven Saerens, Van vergeten naar gegeerd. Dossin en de Joodse herinnering, in: Journal of Belgian History 42 
(2012) 2, 140.
19 Wouters, De Jodenvervolging, 925.
20 Rudi Van Doorslaer, Gebruikt verleden. De politieke nalatenschap van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in België, 
1945–2000, in: Bruno De Wever/ Gita Deneckere (ed.), Geschiedenis maken. Liber amicorum Herman Balt-
hazar, Gent: Tijdsbeeld/Vakgroep Nieuwste Geschiedenis Universiteit Gent/Amsab, 2003, 227-266.
21 Bruno De Wever et al., Oorlogstrauma’s Achter Slot En Grendel, in: De Standaard, 26.6.2013.
22 Lieven Saerens, De Jodenjagers van de Vlaamse SS, Tielt, Lannoo, 2007.
21Robby Van Eetvelde: Judging the Past
S: I. M. O. N.





particularly useful for the latter purpose, having previously been a seminarian.23 The 
amassment of documentation was in other words also influenced by the court’s deci-
sion which suspects to try together. Research into the activity of the anti-Jewish sec-
tion of the Gestapo in Antwerp and Liège was disjointed from research of the sec-
tions fighting the resistance. Individuals who had carried out crimes together were 
also tried together. For the Gestapo in Antwerp, this logic was also followed in other 
cases. The activities of German officers active in fighting the communist or right-
wing resistance were investigated together with those of their Belgian collaborators. 
This fragmentation meant that the research could go into great detail, but it also led 
to the loss of an overview of the Gestapo activities. For example, it is difficult to es-
tablish whether there was a correlation between a rise in the activities of the resist-
ance with subsequent mounting German repression and a rise in anti-Semitic ac-
tions, or the extent to which collaborators with other sections were involved in large-
scale round-ups of Jews. On the other hand, the activities of the Sipo-SD in Liège 
were investigated in four separate cases: against the German officers, against their 
Belgian collaborators, against the Belgian collaborators with the anti-Jewish section, 
and against the Belgian collaborators working for the institutional Sicherheitsdienst, 
the actual SS intelligence service. The case file against the Belgian collaborators was 
not only the most extensive, but also went into most detail regarding day-to-day ac-
tivities and tactics of repression. The trial against the suspected German officers was 
special. It did not limit itself to the German officers active with the Sipo-SD in Liège, 
but extended its reach to members of the outpost in the nearby city of Arlon, as well 
as Germans active with the occupation administration in that city. This heterogene-
ous cohort meant this research was more focused on political issues, the responsibil-
ity for ordering decrees, and shifting blame, among others for the execution of hos-
tages and prisoners. In historical “reality”, however, policing and political matters 
were intertwined and hard to separate. Separating them not only led to substantial 
lacunas in interrogations and reconstructions, but also often entailed twice the work 
for the investigating magistrate. In some cases the extensive work put into amassing 
the material proved to be superfluous. In the case brought against the Gestapo in 
Liège, the court decided to base its case for a large part on the interrogations of one 
man only, the Belgian collaborator Maurice Krier, although a huge array of material 
had been built up. While Krier appears to have been gifted with an amazing memory 
and an eye for detail, relying so heavily on his point of view obviously biased the ju-
dicial research, a circumstance that was challenged by other Belgian collaborators on 
the stand.24 Krier’s statements were bound into a two-hundred page booklet and 
were used at length by other historians who dealt with the Gestapo in Belgium. To 
my surprise, I also came across a copy in the Antwerp city archive.25 Does this mean 
that the testimony of one man not only directed the interpretation of the courts in 
Liège, but also in Antwerp, and perhaps in other parts of Belgium as well?
For historians, however, the extensive preliminary work makes the case files 
themselves a true treasure trove. The nature of the collected material is very diverse. 
It consists of interrogations of suspects, statements by witnesses, surviving original 
23 PV relatant à l’action 14bis, May 10, 1947, Gestapo Liège, Documentation Générale 1, 32, 1, AMC.
24 Déposition de témoin, June 28, 1947, Gestapo Liège, 4A, 7, AMC.
25 Eddy De Bruyne, La Sipo-SD à Liège, 1940–1944. Composantes et lignes de force, Housse, Eddy De Bruyne, 
1998; Eddy De Bruyne, La Sipo-SD à Liège, 1940–1944, in: Bulletin d’Information du Centre Liègeois 
d’Histoire et d’Archéologie Militaires 9, no. 1 (2004), 27-48; Eric Paquet, Sicherheitspolizei – Sicherheitsdienst 
Lüttich et organisation policière allemande à Liège (1940–1944), MA, Université de Liège, 1985; SA (City 
 archive Antwerp), MA 34183, 11. 
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documentation, pictures, and so forth. The personal nature of most of the docu-
ments almost bring the historical actors to live. How did these documents come 
about? The researching magistrate gave the orders to collect the documentation, to 
question the suspects and witnesses, confronted them with each other, weeded out 
inconsistencies in their argumentation, and the like. This task description closely re-
sembles that of a positivist, Rankean historian. Both try to reconstruct history “as it 
actually happened”, as “objectively” as possible. In the case of the military magistrate, 
reconstructing events truthfully is not a philosophical choice but a necessary re-
quirement. The quality of the reconstruction was decisive for a potential conviction 
and punishment of a suspect. Although the researching magistrate’s complete for-
mal objectivity can never be guaranteed, it is my opinion that the historian using the 
material collected in the course of the investigation should acknowledge and profit 
from the zeal that went into the research, instead of dismissing its value a  priori. 
In order to interpret the material correctly, the first important element that has to 
be taken into account is the specific context in which the documents were compiled. 
This context is different for the suspect, the victim, and the interrogator. Suspects, 
living in the shadow of the death penalty or of an extensive imprisonment, wanted to 
minimise their individual responsibility. Informal contacts between collaborators 
under arrest meant that false stories could be harmonised.26 Deceased former col-
leagues or suspects still on the run were easy scapegoats. Eduard Strauch, as Kom-
mandeur der Sicherheitspolizei (KdS) in Wallonia partly responsible for the radicali-
sation of the German repression during the last months of the occupation, com-
plained in an interrogation that he was being used as a scapegoat due to his illness 
(an advanced form of epilepsy) and his extensive absence from the proceedings.27 As 
a former member of Einsatzgruppe A, the mobile killing unit active in the Baltic 
countries, and as KdS of the Sipo-SD in Minsk responsible for the brutal death of 
thousands of Jews, he stood trial in the so-called Einsatzgruppen-trial, one of the 
subsidiary trials held in the context of the International Military Tribunal in Nurem-
berg.28 He was extradited to stand trial for his crimes committed in Belgium only 
after he had received his death penalty there.29 This had provided his colleagues and 
subordinates with ample time to shift as much responsibility for excessive crimes as 
possible onto his shoulders; they expected him to accept this responsibility because 
of his confused mental state. Strauch threatened to expose the crimes of these men as 
a form of retaliation, but did not “want to take upon himself the responsibility of 
talking”.30 This statement probably indicates his frustration with the defence strategy 
chosen by his former subordinates and a vain attempt to implicate them in a similar 
fashion. Other suspects were unashamed in letting their wartime convictions bias 
their post-war statements. Was the aforementioned Felix Lauterboren affirming a 
personal anti-Semitic stereotype or telling the truth when implicating a young girl of 
having denounced her parents of hiding two Jews because she was forced to “share a 
bed” with one of them? Were the vigorous denials of this accusation by the girl in 
question perhaps an attempt to protect her post-war reputation?31 This example 
shows how testimonies by victims can also not be taken at face value. Some had un-
26 Déposition de témoin, August 9, 1946, Evrard –Telgmann–Voss (ETV), Auguste Voss (AV), 2, AMC; Déposi-
tion de témoin, February 4, 1947, Gestapo Liège, 7, 1, 3, AMC.
27 PV d’interrogatoire, June 20, 1950, Strauch et autres (STRAU), 3, 31, AMC.
28 Durchschlag für SS-Personalhauptamt, March 22, 1944, SS-Führer Personalakten (SSO), 066, Bundesarchiv 
Berlin (BArchB); Hilary Earl, The Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial. 1945–1958, New York 2009, 240.
29 Earl, Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 239.
30 PV d’interrogatoire, June 20, 1950, STRAU, 3, 31, AMC.
31 PV 11194, October 16, 1945, Case against Felix Lauterboren et. al. (LAU), LA, XIII, B10, AMC.
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dergone gruesome torture and probably wanted to reverse the balance of power and 
exercise some kind of revenge, if only by making sure their former torturers got the 
sentence they undoubtedly felt they deserved. Several had succumbed under torture 
and wanted to conceal the fact that they had given up brothers in arms to the Ger-
man police. The post-war statements of German Gestapo officer in Antwerp Her-
man Veit and an arrested leading resistance member, who would become the post-
war symbol of resistance in Flanders, could not be more different from each other: 
While the former claimed to have received names and documentation without sub-
mitting the arrestee to a form of “sharp interrogation”, i.e., torture, the latter declared 
that he had been brutalised so extensively he “could no longer remember what had 
happened”.32 Still other witnesses came forward in an effort to turn the dire circum-
stances of the post-war period into a personal profit, claiming for example to have 
helped Jews in hiding.33 Finally, the interrogators themselves steered the testimonies 
into a certain direction. This was partly due to their legal logic. Even though wit-
nesses and suspects often gave elaborate descriptions, the interrogators remained 
primarily interested in identifying acts punishable under the legal framework at 
their disposal. These acts were often highlighted in the individual affidavit, which 
meant that other elements, which may often have been interesting for social histori-
ans, were largely overlooked. A second aspect influencing the interrogations were the 
intellectual capacities and education of some of the German defendants. The afore-
mentioned Strauch held a PhD in law from the university of Konigsberg, present-day 
Kaliningrad.34 Constantin Canaris, nephew of Abwehr chief Wilhelm Canaris, and 
head of the Sipo-SD in Belgium and northern France between 13th of September 
1940 and 26th of November 1941 and again between 1st of February 1944 and 1st of 
August 1944, also held a doctoral title in law. Doubtlessly, these men knew interna-
tional law regarding armed conflict better than their interrogators did. These were 
men who could pull the wool over their interrogator’s eyes, knew what facts to em-
phasise and when to keep silent. The execution of a high-ranking member of the Bel-
gian communist party, who had been arrested in May 1944 for his involvement with 
the armed resistance, serves as an example: Strauch first denied any knowledge of 
personal involvement, subsequently tried to shift the blame to the German military 
administration in Liège and Brussels, and finally admitted having given the authori-
sation for the execution, “not realising what he had signed, his mind being clouded 
by personal problems”.35 The employment of such intricate and evolving defence 
strategies by the suspects further complicated the courts’ efforts to achieve an objec-
tive reconstruction. The same problems of course challenge historians using this ma-
terial.
Documents were also drafted in a very specific language. One element is the use of 
legal terms which require a certain amount of background knowledge by the re-
searcher to correctly assess the information, e.g., the linguistic difference between 
the “hearing” of a witness and the “interrogation” of a suspect.36 Another element to 
32 PV 9813, August 2, 1948, Case against Herman Veit (HV), 10, AMC; PV Verhoor, June 30, 1949, HV, 10, AMC.
33 Robby Van Eetvelde, The Motivation and Fate of Arrested Shelterers of Jews in German Occupied Antwerp 
during World War II (presented at the International Conference on Hiding, Sheltering and Borrowing Identi-
ties, Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, December 19, 2010); Lieven Saerens, Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad. Een ge-
schiedenis van Antwerpen en zijn Joodse bevolking (1880–1944), Tielt, Lannoo, 2000, 728-732.
34 Lebenslauf, November 25, 1934, SSO, 075B, BArchB.
35 PV 9, January 4, 1947, STRAU, 1, STRA, 2, AMC; Déposition de témoin, January 6, 1947, STRAU, 1, STRA, 3, 
AMC; Rapport de Strauch, January 26, 1947, STRAU, 1, LUC, 3, AMC; Déposition de témoin, April 28, 1947, 
Gestapo Liège, 9, 37, AMC.
36 The specific terms used are Déposition de témoin and PV d’interrogatoire.
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consider is the fact that individual affidavits are almost recorded as a monologue, as 
if the private stream of consciousness of the witness or the suspect was transcribed 
onto a piece of paper. In reality, questions asked by the inquiring magistrate or po-
liceman steer the interview in a certain direction, but are rarely mentioned in the 
document.37
The aforementioned problems should always be considered when using these 
sources to construct a historical narrative. However, I don’t consider them funda-
mental enough to completely disregard these sources for historical research. As 
Christopher Browning has correctly pointed out: 
“If historians cannot find ‘smoking pistol’ documents, they must look for pattern 
and fit among the evidence that is available […] a historian must make critical judge-
ments about the use of sources depending upon the questions that are being asked 
and the varying capacity of the available source […] to provide reliable information 
relevant to those questions.”38
Judging the Holocaust
It is often asserted that too little attention was paid to the persecution of the Jewish 
population in Belgium in the post-war trials. In the post-war phase of reconstruc-
tion, an emphasis on the suffering of the country’s own population was considered 
more important than the suffering of a religious minority ninety percent of whom 
had been foreigners. Recent research has both affirmed and negated this point of 
view. The German repression of the resistance and the deportation of political pris-
oners undoubtedly received more attention. This was partly due to the larger sur-
vival rate among this group than among the group of deported Jews. Moreover, a 
legal structure was available which could be used to bring the responsible figures to 
justice. This is not to say that the court deliberately neglected the persecution of the 
Jews. The inherent lower survival rate of the extermination camps meant fewer wit-
nesses could identify their hangmen. It was difficult for the court to identify and ar-
rest the guilty men. The legal framework was moreover unprepared to properly judge 
the perpetrated crimes. By the time preparations had been completed, in the late 
1940’s, too much time had passed to have a realistic expectation of both witnesses 
and perpetrators to give reliable testimonies. In the emerging Cold War climate, the 
punishment of German war criminals had become a less urgent matter.39 Despite 
this, judging by my own research into the activity of the Gestapo in Liège, it is quite 
obvious that the persecution of the Jews received less attention than the fight against 
the resistance. The German leader in charge of the anti-Jewish section was not 
brought to trial. The trial against his collaborators was carried out with less rigour 
and depth than the trial against Belgian collaborators with other sections. An exam-
ple of neglect is Eduard Strauch, in whom the court had on the stand one of the main 
perpetrators of the Holocaust in all of Europe. Not only was he not questioned about 
his involvement with the Final Solution, he was even allowed to euphemistically call 
his genocidal activity in eastern Europe “fighting the partisans” without being cor-
rected.40 It would have been easy to reprimand him since the statement in question 
37 Marijn Van Nooten, Proces-verbaal tot bewijs van het tegendeel, in: Jura Falconis 39, 3 (2002–2003), 337-377.
38 Christopher R. Browning, Collected Memories. Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony, George L. Mosse 
Series in Modern European Cultural and Intellectual History, Madison 2003, 36, 42.
39 Wouters, De Jodenvervolging.
40 Déposition de témoin, January 6, 1947.
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was given when the truth of his gruesome activity was widely known. In Antwerp, 
the military court research into the activities of wartime mayor Leon Delwaide did 
not go into the involvement of the city police in assisting their German counterparts 
in three round-ups in the city’s Jewish quarters: The research was considered to be 
too sensitive.41 Only in 2000 would the contribution of the Antwerp city police to the 
implementation of the Final Solution be brought to the attention of both the aca-
demic establishment and the public at large with the publication of Lieven Saerens’ 
doctoral dissertation. Delwaide’s son, who was also politically active as alderman for 
the harbour of Antwerp, threatened to press charges against the historian, aiming to 
clear his father’s good name and reputation.42 The controversy eventually led to a 
government-funded research project to assess the full involvement of the Belgian 
state with the persecution of its Jewish community. The study, published in 2007 as a 
monograph, aptly titled Gewillig België – Willing Belgium, and counting over a thou-
sand pages, relied heavily on the archives of the military court. The investigation not 
only confirmed Saerens’ findings, but also pointed out in great detail other areas in 
which the Belgian state was implicated in the Final Solution. This participation was 
inspired by a wide ranging “policy of lesser evil”, which can be summed up as a max-
imal accommodation to German wishes in order to avoid the destructions suffered 
during the previous World War, which was still fresh in everyone’s memory.43
Conclusion
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, I still consider the documentation col-
lected for the post-war trials against collaborators and German war criminals a via-
ble and even crucial source for studying the Gestapo and the Holocaust in Belgium. 
The described limitations are due to the post-war political climate, the difficulty of 
correctly interpreting post-factum statements, and the methodological difference 
between a prosecutor and a historian. I described the public prosecutor as the “per-
fect Rankean historian”: this is undoubtedly a caricature, but one with a kernel of 
truth. A conviction beyond reasonable doubt requires an objective reconstruction of 
the past “as it actually happened”. Shades of grey do not exist. What does exist in legal 
matters is black or white, punishable by law or not, guilty or not guilty. The historian, 
looking at the same documentation with more sensitivity for both social realities 
and narratives, can only profit from the work done by the court to weed out incon-
sistencies in statements, to confront conflicting witnesses with each other, and so 
forth. These preparatory efforts and reconstructions by the court can be critically 
reinterpreted by historians. The most important pitfall lies in the adaptation of the 
sources’ inherent legal logic. The former lies in the pre-defined outcome of the pro-
ceedings, i.e., a verdict of guilt or innocence. When writing my narrative, I had to 
remind myself not to put too much emphasis on questions of culpability and respon-
sibility. Instead, the defined research hypothesis should remain the main focus. 
To conclude, historians should always remain critical of their source material. But 
this criticism should not mean the automatic discarding as biased of the extensive 
preparatory work done by the researching magistrate. Every source has inherent 
problems, including even any sources originating as closely as possible to the studied 
41 Saerens, Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad, 752; Wouters, De Jodenvervolging, 924.
42 Frank van Vree, Joden Hadden Weinig Vrienden in Antwerpen, in: Volkskrant, 18.5.2001.
43 Rudi Van Doorslaer (ed.), Gewillig België. Overheid en Jodenvervolging tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 
Antwerpen/Amsterdam/Brussel, Meulenhoff/Manteau, 2007.
26Robby Van Eetvelde: Judging the Past
S: I. M. O. N.





events. This should not, however, lead to self-censorship by historians in the ques-
tions they ask of the past. Just like critical historians can use the work carried out by 
their (neo)positivist peers to build their own narrative, historians, however episte-
mologically inclined, should use every opportunity, including the work of the post-
war courts, to recreate historical “reality”. The alternative to this stance would mean 
no history-writing at all, something everyone should consider a sad prospect. 
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